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F or more than 20 years, programs such as Micro-soft Word have stored their documents in binary !le formats. That’s changing as Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and other developers migrate to 
new XML-based formats for document !les.
Document !les are of critical interest to forensic 
practitioners because of the data they contain; they’re 
also a rich topic for forensic research. Although most 
investigations concern themselves solely with a docu-
ment’s surface content, some examinations dive deeper, 
examining the metadata or deleted material that’s still 
present in the !le. Investigators can, for instance, use 
metadata to identify individuals potentially responsible 
for unauthorized !le modi!cation, establish text plagia-
rization, or even indicate falsi!cation of evidence. Un-
fortunately, metadata can also be modi!ed to implicate 
innocent people—and the ease of modifying these new 
!les means that it’s far easier to make malicious modi!-
cations that are di"cult (if not impossible) to detect.1
With so many aspects to consider, we present a 
forensic analysis of the two rival XML-based of-
!ce document !le formats: the O"ce Open XML 
(OOX) that Microsoft adopted for its O"ce soft-
ware suite and the OpenDocument Format (ODF) 
used by Sun’s OpenO"ce software. We detail how 
forensic tools can exploit features in these !le formats 
and show how these formats could cause problems for 
forensic practitioners. For additional information on 
the development and increased use of these two !le 
formats, see the “Background” sidebar.
Analysis and Forensic Implications
To begin our analysis, we created multiple ODF and 
OOX !les using 
Microsoft O"ce 
2007 for Windows, Microsoft O"ce 2008 for Ma-
cintosh, OpenO"ce 2.3.1, and NeoO"ce 2.2.2 (a 
version of OpenO"ce that runs under MacOS). We 
analyzed these !les using specially written XMLdoc 
tools, including an XML ZIP-!le browser, a search 
utility, and a program for automatically displaying the 
di#erences between two XML-containing ZIP !les. 
These tools are freely available from our Web site 
(www.a$ib.org).
For this study, we decided not to evaluate the digital 
signature provisions of either the ODF or OOX for-
mats because these features are rarely used in practice.
Data Recovery
Overall, we found that ODF and OOX !les tend to 
be smaller than equivalent legacy non-XML !les, al-
most certainly a result of ZIP compression. Although 
it’s trivial to add to or remove parts from a ZIP archive 
after its creation, we found that in many cases, adding 
or removing parts to the archive corrupted the !le so 
that it couldn’t be processed with Microsoft O"ce or 
OpenO"ce.
The ZIP structure for these !les is useful when per-
forming data recovery or !le carving. (File carving is 
the process of recognizing !les by their content, rather 
than !le system metadata. Carving is frequently used 
for recovering !les from devices that have hardware 
errors, have been formatted, or have been partially 
overwritten.) Because each part of the archive includes 
a multibyte signature and a 32-bit cyclic redundancy 
check (CRC32) for validation, we can recover parts of 
Two new of!ce document !le formats (Of!ce Open XML 
and OpenDocument Format) make it easier to glean 
time stamps and unique document identi!ers while 
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a ZIP archive even when other parts of it are damaged, 
missing, or otherwise corrupted. We can also use the 
CRC32 and relative o#sets within the archive to au-
tomatically reassemble fragmented ZIP !les.2 We can 
then manually process recovered parts or insert them 
into other OOX/ODF !les to view the data.
Manifest. ODF and OOX both contain a ZIP direc-
tory as the last structure in the !le. We can examine 
this directory using standard tools, such as the Unix 
unzip command or Sun’s JAR.
ODF has a second directory that stores document 
parts in an XML data structure called Meta-INF/
manifest.xml. The OOX !les store references to the 
additional document parts in the [Content_Types].
xml and .rels parts, in addition to the document con-
tents themselves.
Contents. Both !le formats include a special XML 
!le that contains the document’s main %ow. In ODF, 
the !le content is called content.xml. The primary 
contents of an OOX word processing document cre-
ated with Microsoft O"ce 2007 or 2008 reside in the 
document.xml part, although the standard allows a 
di#erent name to be speci!ed in the [Content_Types].
xml part.
Forensic tools should extract text from the content 
parts, but tool developers must understand that text 
can be present in other document parts as well. For 
example, Microsoft Word allows other Word docu-
ments to be embedded within a Word document us-
ing the “Insert/Object...” menu command. These 
documents are embedded as a named .docx !le inside 
the ZIP archive, as Figure 1 shows. In such an in-
stance, where !les are embedded within other !les, 
investigators should analyze !les recursively using a 
special forensic tool.
The most straightforward way for forensic prac-
titioners to handle these new compound document 
formats is to save the !le and then open it with a 
compliant program. Although this approach works, it 
raises several potential problems:
The compound document might contain active r
content that the forensic investigator doesn’t wish 
to execute. (Despite assurances from Microsoft and 
others that these !le formats are safer, both ODF 
and OOX have provisions for storing active con-
tent3 and therefore can carry viruses.)
Links to external Web sites can reveal that someone r
has captured the !le and is analyzing it.
If parts of the !le are overwritten or missing, appli-r
cations such as Word or OpenO"ce might be un-
able to open the !les. 
Desktop applications can overlook or ignore critical r
information of interest to the forensic investigator.
To this end, we tested both Guidance’s EnCase 6.11 
and AccessData’s Forensic ToolKit 1.8 and determined 
that they could display and search for text inside ODF 
!les, OOX !les, and OOX !les embedded as objects 
inside other OOX !les. 
Both the compressed nature of ODF and OOX 
!les and the multiple codings for the strings pos-
sible within XML represent a signi!cant problem 
for forensic program developers. Because all the text 
is compressed, it’s no longer possible to !nd it by 
scanning for strings within raw disk or document 
 images. And because XML allows strings to be cod-
ed in hexa decimal or even interrupted by comment 
characters (for  example, str<--!  ignore-->ing), 
any forensic tool that takes shortcuts in decoding 
the ZIP archive or implementing the full XML 
schema could return false negatives when perform-
ing searches.
Embedded objects and thumbnails. A big advantage 
of these XML !le formats is that images and other 
objects embedded in word processing !les are stored 
in the ZIP !le as their own parts.
We found that Microsoft O"ce 2008 and Neo-
O"ce for Macintosh both stored thumbnail images 
of the documents’ !rst page by default: Microsoft 
stores the thumbnail as a .jpg, while NeoO"ce stores 
it as two !les—a .png and a .pdf. We also found .pptx 
thumbnails created by PowerPoint 2007 on Win-
dows. However, Word 2007 and Excel 2007 didn’t 



















Figure 1. ZIP archive directory. We embedded a Microsoft Word document 
inside another Microsoft Word document with Word’s “Insert/Object...” 
command.
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“Save preview picture” on the “Advanced Options” 
for the “Save” dialog box isn’t checked by default on 
Word and Excel 2007 the way it is in PowerPoint.
Embedded thumbnails can be valuable in forensic 
practice. If the thumbnail doesn’t match the docu-
ment, then someone modi!ed the thumbnail or the 
document after the !le’s creation. If the !le is no lon-
ger intact, the thumbnail might give the investiga-
tor some idea of the !le’s contents before the !le was 
damaged. The thumbnail can also give a sense of what 
the document is about if the document !le itself is 
corrupted and can’t be completely recovered.
For completeness, we also examined the thumb-
nail images for metadata. The .jpg thumbnails cre-
ated by Microsoft O"ce contained metadata for 
only the image size and resolution, whereas the .pdf 
thumbnails created by NeoO"ce !lled in the PDF’s 
creator, producer, and creation date. However, these 
values merely indicated the program that created the 
thumbnail, not the user who ran the program, as Fig-
ure 2 shows.
Ownership Attribution  
and Unique Identifiers
Unique identi!ers stored within documents can play 
an important role in many forensic investigations. 
Because unique identi!ers remain the same even 
when the document is edited, we can use them to 
track the movement of documents through or be-







Figure 2. The header of a PDF embedded in a NeoOf!ce thumbnail.pdf !le. 
The creator is the UTF-16 coding of the word “Impress,” the producer is 
the UTF-16 coding for NeoOf!ce 2.2, and the creation date is 2008-03-11, 
11:46:31 Paci!c Daylight Time (PDT).
Background
D ocument !les are fundamentally container !les—that is, sin-gle !les (a consecutive stream of bytes) that contain multiple 
data objects. A typical Microsoft Word !le might contain data 
streams associated with the summary info, the main text, tables, 
and embedded images. The !le also contains numerous forms of 
metadata—both for the document and for the container itself.
OpenDocument Format
Sun Microsystems submitted the OpenOf!ce OpenDocument 
Format (ODF) to the Organization for the Advancement of Struc-
tured Information Standards (Oasis). The ODF was approved as 
an Oasis standard on 1 May 20051 and adopted as ISO 26300 the 
following year.
Because of the verbose nature of XML, ODF calls for the XML 
!le to be compressed. Parsing XML can also be time-consuming, 
so ODF uses a single document represented by multiple XML 
!les bundled together into a single ZIP archive. Images and other 
binary objects aren’t coded as XML but are stored natively as 
binary sections in the ZIP archive.
Microsoft’s Of!ce Open XML
Following the introduction of ODF, Microsoft introduced its own 
XML-based document !le formats called WordprocessingML, 
SpreadsheetML, and PresentionML.2 Like ODF, Of!ce Open XML 
(OOX) is a ZIP archive !le consisting of multiple XML document 
elements (unless the !le is encrypted, in which case it’s an OLE 
compound !le). Microsoft refers to the !le as a package, with 
each !le within the archive referred to as a part. 3 As with ODF, 
structured information is !rst encoded into XML and com-
pressed; embedded images are stored as binary objects within 
their own parts.
Because Microsoft’s XML languages are de!ned in terms of 
behaviors built in to Microsoft Of!ce, OOX !les can’t be readily 
translated into ODF or vice versa. 
Microsoft’s Of!ce 2003 allowed these formats to be used as 
alternative document !le formats; with Microsoft Of!ce 2007, the 
XML-based document formats became the default !le format.3 
Native support for Of!ce Open XML is provided today in Micro-
soft Of!ce 2007 for Windows and Of!ce 2008 for Macintosh. 
Additionally, several other programs have the ability to read or 
write Word 2007 !les.
Implications of ZIP for Of!ce Documents
ZIP !les consist of one or more !le sections followed by a central 
directory. Each !le section consists of a local !le header that 
includes metadata such as the !le’s directory and !lename, time 
stamp, compression method used, and additional information, 
followed by the actual !le data and a data descriptor that in-
cludes a 32-bit checksum. The Central Directory Record contains 
the names of all the !les, their offsets within the !le, and their 
time stamps.4
The new XML-based !le formats have several advantages 
when compared with binary !le formats:
Because they’re compressed, !les in the new format are typi-t
cally smaller than !les in the legacy format.
Programs that process document !les need only extract the t
sections that they’re concerned with and can ignore the rest.
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ers found on multiple hard drives, it’s possible to !nd 
previously unknown social networks.4 We can use 
unique identi!ers that survived copying and pasting 
to show plagiarism.
Unique identi!ers can also raise privacy concerns. 
We found many unique identi!ers stored within the 
ODF and OOX !les. Some of them were “unique” 
in that they didn’t occur elsewhere within a speci!c 
XML part or within the ZIP !le: primarily, these 
were 32-bit numbers stored in hexadecimal. Others 
were 128-bit numbers unique for a particular gen-
eration of a particular document. We didn’t !nd any 
unique identi!ers that appeared to be unique for a 
speci!c machine.
For example, OOX de!nes a revision identi!er for 
paragraphs (rsidP and rsidR; see Figure 3). Microsoft 
Word uses these identi!ers to determine the editing 
session in which a user added a paragraph to the main 
document, to aid in Word’s “Compare Documents” 
feature.5 According to the speci!cation, the rsidR val-
ues should be unique within a document: instances 
with the same value within a single document indi-
cate that modi!cations occurred during the same ed-
iting session.
The primary value of these identi!ers to forensic 
examiners is document tracking. Consequently, it’s 
possible—using these numbers—to show that one !le 
probably resulted from editing another !le (although 
there is, of course, a one in four billion chance that 
two of these 32-bit numbers will be the same). How-
ever, the new XML-based formats also make it easier 
to change unique IDs, making it much easier to mali-
<w:footnote w:id=’’0’’ w:type=’’separator’’>
 <w:p w:rsidP=’’003A51D4’’ w:rsidR=’’003A51D4’’ 
 w:rsidRDefault=’’003A51D4’’>
 <w:pPr>
 <w:spacing w:after=’’0’’ w:line=’’240’’ 
 w:lineRule=’’auto’’/>
Figure 3. Unique paragraph revision identi!ers in the Microsoft OOX !le 
format. In this case, the paragraph type appears in the footnotes.xml section.
Only sections that could contain computer viruses need to be t
scanned for computer viruses.
Even if parts of the !le are corrupted, complete ZIP sections can t
still be recovered. This could allow embedded images or even 
content to be recovered under some circumstances. 
Existing tools for handling ZIP !les and XML documents make it 
easier for developers to write programs that can automatically pro-
cess data stored in XML document !les than to process legacy Word 
documents. However, because these are ZIP !les of XML documents, 
they’re far easier to modify. With off-the-shelf tools, an attacker can 
open one of these !les and selectively add or remove information. 
Frequency of ODF and OOX
Both ODF and OOX are still relatively rare, but their numbers are in-
creasing. We performed Google searches by !le type in March, July, 
and September 2008, as well as January 2009 (see Table 1), and 
saw the number of OOX !les nearly triple during this study period.
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Table 1. Prevalence of various !le types, as determined using Google.
FILE TYPE LEGACY OPEN OFFICE XML OPENDOCUMENT FORMAT
Word processing 3/08 .doc 34,900,000 .docx 29,500 .odt 54,800
7/08 .doc 35,500,000 .docx 48,900 .odt 64,800
9/08 .doc 41,500,000 .docx 86,100 .odt 82,500
1/09 .doc 52,200,000 .docx 163,000 .odt 114,000
Spreadsheet 3/08 .xls 6,810,000 .xlsx 5,980 .ods 12,300
7/08 .xls 8,510,000 .xlsx 8,880 .ods 13,400
9/08 .xls 9,310,000 .xlsx 14,700 .ods 16,700
1/09 .xls 11,500,000 .xlsx 52,000 .ods 24,900
Presentation 3/08 .ppt 4,790,000 .pptx 11,900 .odp 17,900
7/08 .ppt 5,540,000 .pptx 21,000 .odp 24,800
9/08 .ppt 6,020,000 .pptx 31,500 .odp 26,600
1/09 .ppt 7,730,000 .pptx 57,300 .odp 37,700
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ciously implicate an innocent computer user or create 
the appearance of a false correlation.
We can imagine two uses of these unique iden-
ti!ers for a forensic examiner. First, it’s possible to 
determine the document’s editing history, even if 
change tracking isn’t enabled. Second, it should be 
possible to generate a database of revision identi!ers 
that appeared in documents distributed by an orga-
nization under investigation. An automated forensic 
analysis tool could use such a database to generate an 
alert whenever an analyst discovers documents with 
this type of identi!er on captured media or observes it 
traveling over a network.
To verify this hypothesis, we created a Word 
2007 document with three paragraphs and saved the 
document. We reopened the package, added another 
paragraph, and saved the document again under a 
new name. We then repeated this process to cre-
ate a third document. By examining the di#erences 
within the ZIP archives, we found the rsidR values 
remained consistent for the common paragraphs in 
each document.
Word 2007’s well-hidden “Trust Center” lets users 
disable the storage of revision identi!ers in documents 
by unclicking the option “Store Random Number to 
Improve Combine Accuracy.” Microsoft’s choice of 
language to describe this feature is quite unrevealing; 
a commentator named Brian Jones noted on Micro-
soft’s blog that a better word for this option would be 
“Enable Anonymous Edit Tracking.” 
The OOX documents also include a store item ID 
that is used to distinguish between custom-created 
pieces and to ensure that data is bound to the cor-
rect location.6 We can use this identi!er in a tracking 
manner similar to a revision identi!er.
Additionally, we found unique identi!ers in each 
PowerPoint slideLayoutN.xml !le created from both 
O"ce 2007 and 2008. People frequently create new 
PowerPoint presentations by starting with an old one 
and changing the slides. Because the PowerPoint .pptx 
format maintains all of the slide layouts, an investiga-
tor could trace presentations that have moved through 
organizations by the presence of nonstandard layouts 
added or by changes to the default layouts.
We weren’t able to observe any unique identi!ers 
in the ODF documents.
Time Information
Time is frequently of critical importance in foren-
sic investigations. Even though the clock on a sus-
pect’s computer can’t be trusted, they’re frequently 
correct (especially on computers that set their time 
automatically over the Internet). Even when a clock 
is wrong, most clocks nevertheless run at more or 
less an even rate.7 Thus, forensic examiners can fre-
quently use !le modi!cation and access times to de-
termine what !les someone saw or modi!ed within 
a certain time period.
Both ODF and OOX contain numerous internal 
time stamps indicating the time that documents were 
created or modi!ed. Time stamps are present in the 
ZIP archive itself, in the embedded XML !les, and 
potentially in other embedded objects (for example, 
in the EXIF headers of embedded JPEGs). Although 
these time stamps are artifacts of the ZIP !le creation 
and aren’t displayed by O"ce applications to the user, 
they nevertheless have the potential to retain some in-
formation about the ZIP !le’s creation and thus could 
be useful in a forensic investigation. 
We examined the ZIP !les created by NeoOf-
!ce and OpenO"ce and found that the times set for 
the !les’ time stamps within the ODF ZIP archive 
matched the system clock. The system expressed the 
time in GMT, without a local time zone correction. 
Microsoft Word and Excel, on the other hand, set the 
time stamp on the !les within the OOX ZIP archive 
to be 1 January 1980 (the epoch of the Microsoft !le 
allocation table [FAT32] system).
In addition to these ZIP directory time stamps, we 
found many other time stamps embedded within vari-
ous XML sections:
Word 2007, Excel, and PowerPoint put the docu-r
ment’s creation date in the dcterms:created tag 
of the core.xml !le. All three coded the modi!ed 
date in the dcterms:modified element of the 
same !le.
PowerPoint 2007 coded the document’s creation date r
in each slideLayoutn.xml !le’s a:fld XML tag. 
When we enabled change tracking in Word 2007, r
the XML !le annotated multiple w:ins tags. Each 
tag included a w:author attribute with the editor’s 
name, a w:date attribute with the date of the mod-
i!cation, and a w:id attribute with the modi!ca-
tion’s ID number.
NeoO"ce encoded the document’s creation date r
in the meta:creation-date tag of the meta.xml 
section contained within the blank OpenDocument 
presentation, spreadsheet, and text (ODP, ODS, and 
ODT) !les we made.
NeoO"ce likewise embedded a thumbnail.pdf !le r
inside the blank ODP, ODS, and ODT !les we 
made. This .pdf !le included comments for a cre-
ation date, as Figure 2 shows.
NeoO"ce embedded the date in a r text:date 
tag within the styles.xml of a blank presentation 
we made.
These time stamps might be signi!cant in a forensic 
examination—for example, they might show when 
someone edited an ODF or OOX !le with an ODF/
OOX-aware application. Or the time stamps might 
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indicate multiple editing sessions. Alternatively, they 
might indicate a tampered document. 
The time stamps of ODF !les are particularly rele-
vant to !le carving because all the time stamps for !les 
within each ZIP archive are the same and, in practice, 
will likely di#er from the time stamps in other ZIP 
archives on the same hard drive. Consequently, we 
can use these time stamps as a unique identi!er for a 
particular ODF !le, which in turn allows us to !nd 
fragmented ODF !les even when the !les are corrupt; 
in many cases, we can intelligently reassemble them.
Hiding Data
There are several approaches for hiding data in ODF 
and OOX !les from forensic analysis, including tradi-
tional encryption and the use of comment !elds.
Encryption
Both OpenO"ce and Microsoft O"ce make it pos-
sible to save !les with encryption so that the user must 
provide a password to open a document. We created 
encrypted documents containing simple text and with 
embedded photographs using both OpenO"ce and 
Microsoft O"ce.
ODF and OOX take fundamentally di#erent ap-
proaches to encrypting documents. ODF applies 
encryption to some of the speci!c segments of the 
document !le, leaving other segments unencrypted. 
The ZIP metadata and directory information, for ex-
ample, remain unencrypted. However, all the docu-













The lack of encryption could potentially leak the 
values for XML tags that might be relevant to an 
investigation: 
meta:generatorr —the speci!c build of the spe-
ci!c application that created the document;
meta:creation-dater —the document’s creation 
date in local time;
dc:languager —the document’s primary language;
meta:editing-cyclesr —the number of times 
someone edited the document;
meta:user-definedr —user-de!nable metadata 
(in our case, tags with the values Info 1 through 
Info 4); and
meta:document-statisticsr —including the 
number of tables, images, objects, page count, para-
graph count, word count, and character count.
The OOX format stores encrypted !les as OLE 
compound !les that have the same .docx, .xlsx, or 
.pptx !le extension.8 The popular 7-Zip decompres-
sion application (www.7-zip.org) can read these !les 








   StrongEncryptionTransform
[6]DataSpaces/TransformInfo/ 





Examining these !les revealed their encryption us-
ing the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) and Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithms with a 
128-bit key. We didn’t attempt further cryptanalysis.
Hiding Data in Comments
We identi!ed several opportunities for hiding data in 
ODF and OOX !les using comments. The !rst ap-
proach doesn’t work well; the second and third do: 
Adding sections to the ZIP archive.1.  When Microsoft 
Word encounters a !le modi!ed in this manner, it 
reports that the archive is corrupted and provides 
an option to recover its data. NeoO"ce, on the 
other hand, silently ignores these additional sec-
tions and opens the ODF !le.
Placing comments directly into the ZIP archive using 2. 
the comment feature that the ZIP !le format provides. 
We tested O"ce 2007, 2008, and NeoO"ce and 
found that these programs appear to ignore ZIP 
comments when the !les are read. When the !les 
are written back out, the application strips the 
comments.
Adding comments to the XML !les as XML comments.3.  
The programs we tested ignored the data stored 
as XML comments. Once again, when !les with 
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comments are written back out, the application 
strips them.
These comment !elds are of concern for forensic 
analysis because, while many document formats allow 
for embedded comments, the forensic tools we test-
ed ignore comments stored in ODF and OOX !les. 
Someone can therefore use embedded comments as a 
channel for covert communications, which is particu-
larly attractive because processing the !le with Word 
may inadvertently remove the covert information.
We created a tool called docx-steg.py for hiding 
arbitrary !les in Microsoft .docx documents and re-
covering them at a later time. Our tool takes the !le, 
encrypts it, base64 encodes it, and stores it as a com-
ment inside one of the !le’s XML sections. This tool is 
also available for download from our Web site.
D espite the fact that Sun Microsystems and Micro-soft have submitted the ODF and OOX speci!-
cations to standards bodies, surprisingly few technical 
articles have published details about the new XML 
document !le formats, and virtually nothing has been 
published regarding their forensic implications. This 
might be in a case where the forensic analysis depends 
on particular aspects of the XML or speci!c applica-
tion software behaviors.
XML is frequently called self-documenting, but 
that’s only the case when tags and attributes have 
names that are easy to !gure out. Unfortunately, most 
information gleaned from inspection is unlikely to 
withstand scrutiny in court: opposing counsel will 
almost certainly demand a clear formal documenta-
tion if a case depends on an XML tag’s interpretation. 
Consider the XML fragment we show in Figure 4. 
Just because the a:fld tag appears to have a unique 
identi!er in its id= attribute, it isn’t enough to estab-
lish that it is, in fact, a unique identi!er.
Despite this important caveat, new XML-based 
!le formats o#er many opportunities for forensic ex-
aminers to learn about the process by which someone 
created a speci!c document. Although the informa-
tion in these new XML !les might also reside in leg-
acy .doc, .xls, and .ppt !le formats, the move to XML 
makes this information far more readily accessible. It’s 
our hope that a new generation of forensic tools can 
make programmatic use of this information without 
the need for additional human intervention. 
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Figure 4. A “unique” identi!er. This tag in a Microsoft PowerPoint slide’s 
XML section appears unique, but is it really?
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